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Abstract
Honkapohja and Mitra (2003) have analyzed the desirability of
optimal and ad hoc interest rules in monetary policy when the fore-
casts of the private sector and the central bank are heterogenous but
information is symmetric. Here we analyze the case of asymmetric
information in which one party does not observe all observable shocks
that the other party sees.
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1 Introduction
Recent literature on the conduct of monetary policy has usually assumed that
the policy instrument is the nominal interest rate in the economy, see e.g.
(Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999) for a survey. Optimal policies and ad hoc
instrument rules have been examined for also determinacy of equilibria and
stability of equilibria under learning, see (Evans and Honkapohja 2003a) for
a review of recent research in this area. The basic message of the literature
is that conditions for determinacy and stability of the equilibrium under
adaptive learning can be expressed as constraints between the parameters of
the policy rule and structural parameters of the economy. Good monetary
policy should respect these constraints so as to avoid fluctuations that would
otherwise arise.
The literature has examined a variety of policy rules for the determinacy
and learnability constraints. An important case are the rules in which the
instrument of monetary policy responds to forecasts of future endogenous
variables. This is important since in practice there can be lags in the eﬀects
of policy and, moreover, responses to lagged data can by itself contribute to
fluctuations in the economy.
A diﬃculty with interest rate rules that respond to private forecasts of
inflation and economic activity is that the relevant forecasts are in fact pri-
vate forecasts since they presumably influence private economic behavior
and there can be errors in measuring private expectations of inflation and
economic activity. If there are large measurement errors, then internal fore-
casts by the central bank can be considered a proxy for private forecasts.
(Honkapohja and Mitra 2003) have examined the learnability of equilibria
under interest rate rules that depend on central bank internal forecasts. Their
analysis focuses on the basic case of symmetric information, i.e. both central
bank and private sector forecasts are based on the same data on macroeco-
nomic variables.
The assumption of symmetric information is a natural starting point,
but obviously diﬀerences in the information sets can exist and they raise
further issues for viability of monetary policy. In this paper we examine
some issues of asymmetric information in forecasting between the private
sector and the central bank. We take up a simple but plausible case of
asymmetric information. One agent, say the private sector, has superior
(full) information, as it observes both of the two shocks, while the other
agent sees only one shock. An alternative assumption is that the central
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bank has full and the private sector limited information and we also present
the results for this case.1 We derive the eﬀects of the postulated information
asymmetry on the learnability constraints that good monetary policy should
respect.
2 Analytical Framework
We employ a standard log-linearized model of monopolistic competition with
price stickiness as outlined e.g. in (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999). The
structural model consists of an IS curve and a New Phillips curve:
zt = −ϕ(it − EˆPt πt+1) + EˆPt zt+1 + gt, (1)
πt = λzt + βEˆPt πt+1 + ut, (2)
where zt is the “output gap”, πt is the inflation rate, and it is the nominal
interest rate. EˆPt πt+1 and Eˆ
P
t zt+1 denote private sector expectations of in-
flation and output gap next period. The same notation without the “ˆ” and
superscript P denotes RE of the private sector. The parameters in (1) and
(2) are positive. 0 < β < 1 is the discount rate.
gt and ut denote observable shocks following AR(1) processes:µ
gt
ut
¶
= F
µ
gt−1
ut−1
¶
+
µ
gˆt
uˆt
¶
, F =
µ
µ 0
0 ρ
¶
, (3)
where 0 < µ < 1, 0 < ρ < 1 and gˆt ∼ iid(0,σ2g), uˆt ∼ iid(0,σ2u). gt and ut are
the demand and “cost push” shocks, respectively.
We supplement equations (1) and (2) with a rule for the nominal interest
rate it in which the interest rate is adjusted in accordance with the central
bank expectations of output gap and inflation. Then
it = χ0 + χπEˆ
CB
t πt+1 + χzEˆ
CB
t zt+1. (4)
Again the same notation without the “ˆ” and superscript CB will denote
RE (of the central bank). The rule (4) with private expectations in place of
central bank forecasts has been considered in the literature; either as a version
of an ad hoc Taylor (or instrument) rule, see e.g. (Bullard and Mitra 2002)
1(Sargent 1999) and (Cho, Williams, and Sargent 2002) study a model of the natural
rate hypothesis and a misspecification by the central bank.
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or as an expectations based optimal discretionary policy as in (Evans and
Honkapohja 2003b). We assume χz ≥ 0 and χπ ≥ 0 throughout the paper.
The reduced form of (1), (2), (3), and (4) is
yt = D +A
P EˆPt yt+1 +A
CBEˆCBt yt+1 +Bwt, (5)
wt = Fwt−1 + vt.
where yt = (zt,πt)0, wt = (gt, ut)0 and
D =
µ
−ϕ
−λϕ
¶
χ0, A
P =
µ
1 ϕ
λ β + λϕ
¶
, ACB =
µ
−ϕχz −ϕχπ
−λϕχz −λϕχπ
¶
B =
µ
1 0
λ 1
¶
.
3 Asymmetric Information between the Pri-
vate Sector and Central Bank
Using a standard approach to learning discussed in the treatise (Evans and
Honkapohja 2001), (Honkapohja and Mitra 2003) study this model of learn-
ing for various cases of heterogenous learning. They establish constraints for
the policy parameters that need to be fulfilled in order to have stability of
the resulting REE under adaptive learning. Here we consider heterogeneity
in forecasting arising from diﬀerences in the information sets of the private
agents and the central bank.
We take up only one case in which one party observes only one of shocks
while the other sees both of them. We develop the formal analysis when
the central bank does not see ut and, moreover, does not have a good signal
about it. If the private sector observes both shocks, its perceived law of
motion (PLM) and forecasts have the form
yt = a
P + bPwt, where a
P =
µ
aPz
aPπ
¶
and bP =
µ
bPzg b
P
zu
bPπg b
P
πu
¶
EˆPt yt+1 = a
P + bPFwt.
The central bank guesses that the values of the endogenous variables depend
just on the aggregate demand shock gt. The PLM and the forecast function
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of the central bank have the form
yt = a
CB + bCBgt, where a
CB =
µ
aCBz
aCBπ
¶
and bCB =
µ
bCBz
bCBπ
¶
,
EˆCBt yt+1 = a
CB + bCBµgt.
The forecast function of the central bank does not nest the symmetric
information REE, i.e. the PLM of the central bank is misspecified even
asymptotically. However, the economy may converge to some equilibrium
that is rational in a limited information sense. These restricted perceptions
equilibria (RPE) are studied in Chapter 13 of (Evans and Honkapohja 2001).
Substituting the resulting forecast functions into (5), the actual law of
motion (ALM) is
yt =
µ
1 ϕ
λ β + λϕ
¶
aP +
µ
−ϕχz −ϕχπ
−λϕχz −λϕχπ
¶
aCB +·µ
1 ϕ
λ β + λϕ
¶
bPg +
µ
−ϕχz −ϕχπ
−λϕχz −λϕχπ
¶
bCB
¸
µgt +µ
1 ϕ
λ β + λϕ
¶
bPu ρut +
µ
1 0
λ 1
¶µ
gt
ut
¶
,
where bPg and b
P
u are, respectively, the 1st and 2nd columns of matrix b
P . We
can write this formally as
yt = A
PaP +ACBaCB +
£
µ
¡
AP bPg +A
CBbCB
¢
+Bg
¤
gt + (ρAP bPu +Bu)ut,
(6)
where Bg, Bu are the columns of B defined in (5).
The parameters for both PLMs are assumed to be updated by recursive
least squares. The RLS algorithm for the private sector takes the form
(φPt )
0 = (φPt−1)
0 + t−1(RPt )
−1xt−1(yt−1 − φPt−1xt−1)0 (7)
RPt = R
P
t−1 + t
−1[xt−1(xt−1)
0 −RPt−1].
Introducing the notation ξCBt = (a
CB
t , b
CB
t ) and (x
CB
t )
0 = (1, gt), the estima-
tion algorithm for the central bank takes the form
(ξCBt )
0 = (ξCBt−1)
0 + t−1(RCBt )
−1xCBt−1(yt−1 − ξCBt−1xCBt−1)0, (8)
RCBt = R
CB
t−1 + t
−1[xCBt−1(x
CB
t−1)
0 −RCBt−1].
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This formulation is similar to that of the algorithm of the private sector,
except that ut does not appear in the state variables x
CB
t .
The RPE is given by the solution to the equations
aP = APaP +ACBaCB,
aCB = APaP +ACBaCB,
bP =
£
µ(AP bPg +A
CBbCB) +Bg, ρAP bPu +Bu
¤
,
bCB = µ(AP bPg +A
CBbCB) +Bg.
We have the stability result:
Proposition 1 The RPE is locally stable under learning if all eigenvalues
of the following two matricesµ
AP − I ACB
AP ACB − I
¶
, ρAP − I.
have negative real parts.
The proof is in the Appendix. The first condition in Proposition 1 is
simply the E-stability requirement for the full information REE. The second
condition requires the autocorrelation coeﬃcient ρ in the cost push shocks to
be suﬃciently small since AP has an eigenvalue bigger than one (the other
one being between 0 and 1). Computing the eigenvalues of AP , we get:
Corollary 2 The RPE is locally stable under learning iﬀ
(1− β)χz + λ(χπ − 1) > 0,
(2β)−1[1 + β + λϕ−
p
(1 + β + λϕ)2 − 4β] ≥ ρ.
The first condition is just the Taylor principle that characterizes stability
under learning if both the private sector and the central bank have identical
learning rules, see (Bullard and Mitra 2002). The second condition can be
restrictive, especially when there is high persistence in the ut shock.
2
The results are quite diﬀerent if, in contrast, the private sector observes
less than the central bank.
2If instead the central bank observes (only) the ut shock but not the gt shock, then the
condition for stability is the same as above with µ replacing ρ in Corollary 2. If the CB
observes neither shock, then the stability conditions also include the same upper bound
for µ.
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Proposition 3 The stability condition reduces to the standard requirement
(1− β)χz + λ(χπ − 1) > 0
in either case of non-observability of gt or ut by the private sector.
The proof follows by interchanging the roles of AP and ACB in Proposition
1 and noting that the eigenvalues of ACB are non-positive.
4 Concluding Comments
The preceding results suggest that lack of information on the part of the
central bank can lead to problems of instability under learning more eas-
ily than when information is symmetric. Corollary 2 indicates that, in the
case of central bank having less information about the shocks than the pri-
vate sector, there is a further learnability constraint that must be met by
the policy maker in addition to the learnability constraint that arises in the
symmetric information setting. In contrast, if the private sector has less in-
formation than the central bank, then Proposition 3 indicates that no further
learnability constraint arises as a result of the asymmetric information.
Our results support the general notion that the central bank should spend
enough resources in acquiring good information about the shocks hitting the
economy. There is recent empirical evidence that the Federal Reserve appears
to possess information about the current and future state of the economy that
is not known to commercial forecasters, see (Romer and Romer 2001).
5 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
Using the methodology in Section 13.1.1 of (Evans and Honkapohja 2001)
we compute the associated diﬀerential equation (ODE) for the algorithms
(7) and (8)
E(RP )−1xt−1(yt−1 − φPxt−1)0
= E(RP )−1


1
gt−1
ut−1

 £(zt−1,πt−1)− (1, gt−1, ut−1)(φP )0¤
= E(RP )−1


1
gt−1
ut−1



(1, gt−1, ut−1)




a˜z a˜π
A˜zg A˜πg
A˜zu A˜πu

− (φP )0



 ,
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where the temporary notation a˜z, A˜zg etc. is obtained from
(zt−1,πt−1) = (1, gt−1, ut−1)


a˜z a˜π
A˜zg A˜πg
A˜zu A˜πu

 .
Taking expectations and limits the ODE for the private sector becomes
dφP/dτ = (RP )−1(Exx0)[TP (φP ,φCB)− φP ] (9)
dRP/dτ = Exx0 −RP ,
where Exx0 = limtExtxt0 and
TP (φP ,φCB) = (APaP +ACBaCB, µ(AP bPg +A
CBbCB) +Bg, ρA
P bPu +Bu).
The ODE for the algorithm of the central bank is analogously
E(RCB)−1xCBt−1(yt−1 − φCBxCBt−1)0
= E(RCB)−1
µ
1
gt−1
¶
(1, gt−1)
·µ
a˜z a˜π
A˜zg A˜πg
¶
− (φCB)0
¸
+E(RCB)−1
µ
1
gt−1
¶
ut−1(A˜zu, A˜πu).
Since gt and ut are uncorrelated and have zero means, the second term in
this expression is zero. The ODE for the central bank is then
dφCB/dτ = (RCB)−1(ExCB(xCB)0)[TCB(φP ,φCB)− φCB] (10)
dRCB/dτ = ExCB(xCB)0 −RCB,
where ExCB(xCB)0 = limtExCBt (x
CB
t )
0 and
TCB(φP ,φCB) = (APaP +ACBaCB, µ(AP bPg +A
CBbCB) +Bg).
Local stability of the associated diﬀerential equations (9) and (10) is
governed by the local stability of the “small” diﬀerential equations
dφP/dτ = TP (φP ,φCB)− φP
dφCB/dτ = TCB(φP ,φCB)− φCB,
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which are the modified E-stability diﬀerential equations. Inspecting the TP
and TCB mappings it is seen that for constant terms aP and aCB, as well as for
the terms bPg and b
CB, standard E-stability arguments apply, see (Honkapohja
and Mitra 2003) while the E-stability equation for bPu is simply
dbPu /dτ = (ρA
P − I)bPu +Bu,
which completes the proof.
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